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J. K. Ingalls. "Tolstoi on Henry George and Single Tax." ''The Twentieth Century''. 20, 11 (March 12, 1898) 9-12. 


TOLSTOI ON HENRY GEORGE AND SINGLE TAX.

BY J. K. INGALLS.

In ''American Review of Reviews'' for January, Count
Tolstoi has a notice of Henry George and the Single
Tax. The tribute he pays to the memory of this prominent
reformer is just. It is only one particular of Geo treatment of the Land Question which I desire
to examine. Mr. George, with all s thoroughness of
investigation, still took one of the accredited doctrines
of the Political Economists on' trust and gave it a
credit atld scope to which it is not entitled. I refer to
the Ricardo Theory of Rent. ThlS he denominates
"Economic Rent," yet confounds. it with Tribute, or
landlord rent. While defining this latter rent is the
"price of monopoly," he draws no distinction between
them, and virtually treats the two- as one. Count Tolstoi
follows blindly in the same error; but could not
have done so, had he taken a moment' to analyze the
nature and' operation of these two forces, which resem
ble each other in no respect but in name, as will
be ~een:

First. Economic Rent is derived only through
application of labor to choice soils and situations, and
so would wholly disappear if all places were equally
desirable. Tribute or the price of monopoly is derived
from privilege, lordly dominion of the land, and would
be unaffected in every way, did all holdings become
equd,1}y desirable.

Seetmd. Economic Rent is modified by the discovery
of new uses for inferior holdings, and operates to promote
self-employment. Tribute rent attaches to all
lands, fertile or otherwise, and its operation is to
incrp,8.se industrial dependence, and enforce idleness.

Third. Economic Rent is simply the excess of the
earnings of labor, over its consumption, and so is an
exchangable quantity. Tribute rent has no economic
equivalent tor which it can be exchanged. It takes
something for which nothing is given.

Fourth. Economic Rent accumulates by equal differences,
as 0, J, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc. Monopolistic rent, by
geometrical ratio of 2, as I, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, etc., so
that in the time the one attains 10, the other equals
1,024. No equazion is possible with such ratios. No
"supply and demand" C:ln have scope with such un·
equal proportions.

Fifth. EconomlC Rent is an alternating quantity;
sometimes above and sometimes below the mean or
average. An abundant crop on superior soil, will at
times exchange at a disadvantage with a short crop of
some other product on an inferior soil. The soils below
the average usually yield no economic rent. Monopoly
rent falls on all SOlIs, however, rich or poor,
while at the same time the monopoly enables lands to
be held out of market, for sporting or speculative
purposes.

Thus David Ricardo's II Theory of Rent," has been
stretched to cover what is due solely to a prerogative
of arbitrary power. And neither Mr. George nor Count
Tolstoi has detected the subtle perversion of the truth.
They have embraced both of thes6 distinctive and in.
compatible forces as one and the same. Neither of
these eminent and conscientious men has attempted
to show any necessity for interfering with the working
of economic law. Nor could the Single Tax, with unlimited
leases be different in its operation to rob labor
of its earnings, from the rack rent under allodial titles,
or lee simple. For only the hartnleSs economic rent
could be taxed back, or confiscated under the Single
Tax, limited or unlimited. B<"'cause totax the increase
of the leaseholder, would be, nota single, but a doulJl~
tax, with no reference to the rental value of tho
land

Admitting that the si'ngletax would compelthe selling
of unused land, those able to hold the land and extend
their cultivation, would thus help increase production,
reducing the price of products. Holders unable
to improve and make profitable use of their land
would throw it on the market; reducing the demand
for leases to the lowest point. The economic rent would
alone be left for the government. Without the "limitation
of estates in land," advocated by Geo. H. Evans.
and the pure Land Reformers for more than seventy
years, the entire Tnbute Rent now paid to the lord of
the land, and who whether deed holder or lease holder,
would then pay only the economic rent to the government for his privilege, to use the land.
Mr. George seems to have had a glimmering of this
truth, for he contended that rent of capital and rate of
wages would increase, as rent diminished, and which
would necessarily result under unconditioned leasehold.
It is evident that Count Tolstoi did not consider
this, for he refers to existing back rents in Russia as
remaining the same now as under the Single Tax. It
IS quite certain that rent of capital would greatlV
appreciate but that wages would appreciate permanently,
there is not the least probability.

The condition of the poor migbt be temporarily
alleviated by a proper distribution of such rent, but
experience does not encourage the expectation of equity
in such distribution. Besides government would
have to make good the losses on inferior soils, and restore
the exhausted fertility, of others.

With the limitation of holdings in Mr. Alfred Russel
Wallace's "Land Nationalization," the remedy of
Mr. George would doubtless prove salutary in a country
where the leasehold, as in England, is the only recognized
title to land. But such limitation applied to
allodial titles, would be still more certain of beneficial
results.

But it may be properly asked, I think, why not remove
the cause of the evil? That is, the law created
private might to forcibly take tribute for use of land
one cannot or prefers not to use, or of money or plant
one does not care to take the trouble of employing-.
To repeal the laws collecting monopoly rent, interest
or profit, or dues of any kind, except where economic
increase is distinctly shown, would certainly eliminate
the forces now active In the accumulation of large estates,
either real or personal.

The advocates of the Single Tax have shown much
adroitness,in repelling the argument that the landlord
could shift the tax to the tenant. And this is not possible,
to be sure, where, he has already taken all the
surplus earnings of the tenant. But he has another
resource. Any title to land or improvement of same,
has value only as it yields increase. When the rent ceases, the land has no price to the landlord and he will have no difficulty, with unlimited leases, in transfering the "chose in possession" to a "chose local," and
charge "all the traffic will bear" as rent, interest or
profit upon his bui1dings, stock and plant, or money
invested.

----
* Joshua King Ingalls, “Tolstoi on Henry George and Single Tax,” ''The Twentieth Century'' 20, no. 11 (March 12, 1898): 9-12.


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